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 Coercive Institutions and Female Empowerment: Legacies of a Colonial Experiment on Java 
In this paper, we study the effects of the Dutch Cultivation System on Java that forced the native population to 
switch from subsistence rice production to sugar and coffee cultivation for exports. First, we show that the 
cultivation of sugar, but not the cultivation of coffee, is associated with stronger historical women empowerment. 
Second, on the basis of the existing literature, we hypothesize that this institutional shock might have affected 
current female empowerment through: an increase in female labor demand and supply. In the long run, we find 
some empirical evidence for the labor demand channel, but not the labor supply channel.  
Keywords: coercive institutions, sugar cultivation, women empowerment, sex ratio 
JEL classification: N25, O1, O12 
 
Do consumers choose to stay ignorant?  
The role of information in the purchase of ethically certified products 
The paper analyzes how consumers access information about ethical certificates and how access to this 
information influences consumers’ purchasing decisions. This study finds that consumers do not ignore 
information about the effectiveness of ethical certificates in a systematic manner. Also, as long as the access to 
information is costless, varying the way it is provided to consumers does not influence the purchasing decision 
between a certified and an uncertified product. However, consumers are extremely price sensitive: once a small 
cost for information is introduced, most consumers are not willing to access it, and the share of consumers buying 
the certified product decreases significantly. 
Keywords: strategic ignorance, market, ethical consumption, Fair Trade, Fairtrade, ethical labels 
JEL classification: C91, D12, D64, D89 
 
Environmental investment decisions: experimental evidence of team versus individual decision making 
We study experimentally how investment decisions are affected by equally stringent but different policy regime 
treatments. In our experiment, subjects decide on an investment level either individually or jointly in groups of 
three. In addition, decisions are made subject to either a tax or performance standard treatment. We find that 
investments are significantly higher and closer to the level that maximizes revenues of the hypothetical firm in the 
performance standards treatment. This holds for both, individual and group decisions but we find no evidence of 
an interaction effect.  
Keywords: group behavior, investment inefficiencies, policy instruments 
JEL classification: C92, D70, H32 
 
Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of 
voluntary cooperation  
Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We 
study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which 
voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the 
time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely 
repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop 
in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by 
cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game.  
Keywords: strategic ignorance, cooperation, prisoners' dilemma, experiment 
JEL classification: C91, D83, D89 
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